A pattern that keeps repeating, until it does not
Brent crude closed at $143.67 a barrel on May 28, 2026. It was the highest nominal price since July 2008, when oil briefly touched $147 before the financial crisis dragged everything down. The current spike has been faster than any previous oil shock. It took 197 days for oil to double during the 1973 Arab oil embargo. It took 94 days during the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This time, oil doubled in 47 days, from $68 on March 15 to $139 on May 1. Speed matters. When prices move this fast, the downstream effects hit before anyone can adjust.
I have spent the past three weeks talking with energy economists, commodity traders, and oil company executives about how this crisis compares to previous shocks. The short answer is that it shares DNA with all of them and is worse than most of them. The long answer requires walking through each one.
1973: the original shock
The Arab oil embargo began in October 1973, when OAPEC, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, announced an oil embargo against nations supporting Israel in the Yom Kippur War. The embargo cut production by about 5 million barrels per day, roughly 10 percent of global supply at the time. The price of a barrel of oil went from $3 to $12 in five months. Adjusted for inflation, that is roughly a move from $21 to $78 in 2026 dollars.
The parallels to today are structural. In 1973, the supply cut was deliberate and political. The exporters used oil as a weapon. Iran is doing the same thing now by controlling Hormuz. The difference is one of scale. In 1973, the embargo removed about 5 million barrels per day from the market. The Hormuz closure has removed roughly 17 million barrels per day, the amount of crude and refined products that normally transits the strait. That is more than three times the volume. The reason the price has not gone even higher, some traders told me, is that the market still believes the closure is temporary. Once that belief fades, prices will move again.
The 1973 embargo also changed the global energy system permanently. It triggered the creation of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in the United States, the International Energy Agency, and massive investments in non-OPEC production, particularly in the North Sea and Alaska. The current crisis will likely have similarly lasting effects, but the investments will be in alternative supply routes, not alternative production. You cannot drill your way out of a chokepoint.
1990: the Kuwait shock
When Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, it removed about 4.5 million barrels per day of combined Iraqi and Kuwaiti production from the market. Prices doubled from around $20 to $40 in three months, reaching roughly $74 in 2026 dollars. But the spike was short-lived. Saudi Arabia, which had spare capacity, increased production by 3 million barrels per day within weeks. The IEA coordinated a release of 2.5 million barrels per day from strategic reserves. By January 1991, when the coalition air campaign began, prices were already falling.
The 1990 shock is relevant to today because it shows what happens when there is a swing producer available to compensate. Saudi Arabia in 1990 could replace most of the lost supply. Saudi Arabia in 2026 cannot, not because it lacks capacity, but because its oil must still pass through Hormuz. The kingdom's eastern province terminals, Ras Tanura and Ju'aymah, load tankers that sail through the strait. The only Saudi crude that bypasses Hormuz comes through the Petroline pipeline to the Red Sea, which has a maximum capacity of about 5 million barrels per day. Saudi total production is roughly 10 million. You see the problem. Half of Saudi oil is as trapped as everyone else's.
2008: demand, not supply
The 2008 price spike was fundamentally different from the others. It was not caused by a supply disruption. It was caused by surging demand from China, India, and other emerging economies, combined with financial speculation and a weak dollar. Oil went from $60 in early 2007 to $147 in July 2008. Adjusted for inflation, that is roughly $181 in 2026 dollars, the highest real price ever recorded.
The 2008 spike is instructive for what happened next. When the global financial crisis hit in September 2008, demand collapsed and oil fell to $33 by December. The lesson: demand-driven spikes can reverse quickly when the economy contracts. Supply-driven spikes last as long as the supply disruption lasts. The current crisis is supply-driven, and the supply disruption has no clear end date. That is what makes it more dangerous than 2008.
Another difference between 2008 and now is the role of the SPR. In 2008, the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve held about 700 million barrels. Today it holds roughly 370 million barrels, depleted by the 2022 release under the Biden administration. The current SPR inventory represents about 18 days of total US petroleum consumption. In 2008, it was 35 days. The cushion is thinner. The Biden administration's 2022 release of 180 million barrels was the largest in history. It worked to moderate prices during the Russia-Ukraine crisis, but it left the reserve at its lowest level since 1983. The Trump administration has been slow to refill it, and now the reserve is too low to provide meaningful relief in a crisis of this magnitude.
2022: Russia and the SPR
The 2022 oil shock following Russia's invasion of Ukraine is the most recent precedent, and in some ways the closest to the current situation. Russian crude exports of about 5 million barrels per day were partially disrupted by sanctions and voluntary embargoes by Western buyers. Brent crude went from $90 in late January to $129 in March. But the spike was contained by the largest SPR release in history and by the fact that Russian oil continued to flow to China and India at discounted prices. Global supply never actually contracted. It was redirected.
This time, there is no redirect. There is no "discounted Hormuz oil" finding its way to willing buyers through back channels. The strait is physically blocked. The oil behind the blockade cannot reach any market, at any price. It is not a question of who is willing to buy it. It is a question of how to get it out of the Gulf. That distinction, between a reroutable supply disruption and a physically trapped supply, is why this crisis is categorically different from 2022.
Why this time is different
Every previous oil shock had a release valve. In 1973, the embargo ended when Arab states lifted it. In 1990, Saudi spare capacity filled the gap. In 2008, the financial crisis destroyed demand. In 2022, SPR releases and Russian redirections kept supply flowing. In 2026, there is no release valve. The SPR is depleted. Saudi spare capacity is trapped behind the same blockade. No alternative route can move 17 million barrels per day. The Cape of Good Hope adds two weeks to voyages but does not create new oil. Pipelines can handle at most 7 million barrels per day combined. The remaining 10 million is simply off the market.
Amrita Sen, director of research at Energy Aspects, told me: "The market has been pricing in a reopening of Hormuz for the past three weeks. That assumption is the only thing keeping prices below $180. If the Muscat talks collapse, I do not see what prevents a move to $200 or beyond." A $200 oil price translates to roughly $6 to $7 per gallon of gasoline in the United States. In Europe, where taxes are higher, it means petrol above 2.50 euros per liter. In India, which subsidizes fuel, it means a fiscal crisis. In Sub-Saharan Africa, which imports nearly all its petroleum, it means some countries simply running out.
I keep coming back to a number that a trader at Vitol mentioned to me off the record. He said: "In every previous crisis, there was always someone who could produce more, release more, or redirect more. This is the first crisis where there is literally nobody who can add a single barrel to the market that is not already being produced." He paused. "That has never happened before. Not once in the history of the oil market." That is the difference. Not the price, not the speed, but the absence of any offset. The world has never experienced an oil shock where every possible lever has already been pulled.