The convoy starts at dawn
Every morning at 0530 local time, a radio broadcast on VHF Channel 16 announces the formation of that day's convoy through the Strait of Hormuz. The message comes from the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, the aircraft carrier serving as the flagship for Operation Project Freedom. It gives the convoy assembly point, the estimated transit time, and the call signs of the escort vessels. Any commercial vessel wishing to transit under coalition protection must acknowledge and proceed to the assembly point by 0700. The convoy moves at 0800. If you are late, you wait until tomorrow.
The system is modeled on the convoy operations that the US Navy ran during the Tanker War of 1987 and 1988, when Kuwaiti tankers were reflagged under the American flag and escorted through the Persian Gulf under Operation Earnest Will. The parallels are not lost on the planners. I spoke with a retired Navy captain who served as a surface warfare officer on the USS Kidd during Earnest Will. He told me: "We learned a lot in 1987 that applies directly to what they are doing now. The mine threat, the small-boat swarm tactics, the Silkworm missiles. The IRGC has better equipment now, but the geometry of the strait has not changed. You still have to get through a 21-mile-wide channel with Iran on one side."
Operation Project Freedom was announced on April 28, 2026, three weeks after the Strait of Hormuz became functionally impassable for most commercial traffic. The coalition includes the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and, in a limited capacity, Saudi Arabia, which has provided two frigates. The stated mission is to "ensure the free flow of commerce through the Strait of Hormuz." In practice, that means putting warships between Iranian fast-attack craft and civilian tankers.
The three attacks
The first attack on an escort vessel happened on May 5, eleven days into the operation. The USS Carney, an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer serving as a flank escort for Convoy 7, detected an incoming anti-ship cruise missile at 1422 local time while transiting the central channel of the strait. The missile, identified by US Central Command as a Chinese-designed C-802 variant manufactured in Iran as the Qader, was launched from a mobile platform on Qeshm Island, roughly 30 kilometers north of the shipping lane. The Carney's Aegis combat system engaged the missile with an SM-2 interceptor and destroyed it approximately 12 kilometers from the ship. Debris fell into the water 800 meters from the nearest commercial vessel in the convoy, the MT Pacific Glory, a Marshall Islands-flagged VLCC carrying Saudi crude.
The second attack came on May 14, during Convoy 12. The HMS Defender, a British Type 45 destroyer, was leading the convoy through the western approach when three IRGC Boghammar-class fast-attack boats attempted to close with the rear of the formation. The Defender broadcast warnings on VHF and fired warning shots from its 30mm cannon. The boats initially retreated, then two of them turned back and launched what the UK Ministry of Defence described as "improvised explosive devices" toward the convoy. The devices, which appeared to be remotely operated surface drones packed with explosives, detonated approximately 400 meters from the MT Nordic Spirit, a product tanker. The shockwave damaged the tanker's port-side lifeboat davits but did not breach the hull. The Defender engaged one of the fast-attack boats with its 4.5-inch main gun, striking the vessel's stern and disabling it. The other two boats withdrew to Iranian territorial waters. The disabled boat was later recovered by IRGC vessels.
The third attack was the most serious. On May 22, during Convoy 17, the FS Bretagne, a French Aquitaine-class frigate, was providing rear escort when it was targeted by a Shahed-136 loitering munition, the same type of drone Russia has used extensively in Ukraine. The drone was detected at low altitude by the frigate's radar, but its small radar cross-section and low speed made classification difficult. The crew initially assessed it as a commercial drone. By the time it was reclassified as a threat, it was within 3 kilometers and closing fast. The Bretagne's 20mm Narwhal remote weapon system engaged and destroyed the drone approximately 1,500 meters from the ship. Fragments struck the frigate's helicopter hangar, causing minor damage and injuring one sailor, a 24-year-old petty officer who was treated for lacerations and returned to duty the same day.
How the convoy system works
A typical Operation Project Freedom convoy consists of three to five commercial vessels and four to six warships. The composition depends on what is available and what needs to move. Priority is given to vessels carrying energy commodities: crude oil, refined products, and liquefied natural gas. Container ships and general cargo vessels are escorted when capacity allows, but the waiting list for a convoy slot is currently running five to seven days for non-energy traffic.
The escort formation places a destroyer or cruiser at the lead, two lighter warships on the flanks, and a frigate at the rear. A helicopter, usually an MH-60R Seahawk, provides overhead surveillance and can deploy sonobuoys to detect submarines or underwater drones. The formation is designed to present multiple layers of defense against the three main threat types: anti-ship missiles from shore-based launchers, fast-attack boat swarms, and drones.
The transit itself takes four to six hours, compared to roughly two hours under normal conditions. The slower speed is deliberate. The commercial vessels in the convoy are restricted to 10 knots to maintain formation integrity, and the escort vessels slow further at known chokepoints to allow their sensors to sweep the approaches. The narrowest point of the strait, where the navigable channel is roughly 6 kilometers wide, is the most dangerous section. It is also the section closest to Iranian territory on both sides. Qeshm Island, which is Iranian, extends the northern coastline into the channel. The UAE port of Fujairah sits on the southern side. A missile launched from Qeshm has less than 30 seconds of flight time to reach a ship in the channel at that point.
Convoy scheduling is not announced in advance to the public, for obvious reasons. But the IRGC likely knows the schedule anyway. The assembly point for each convoy is visible from satellite imagery, and the concentration of commercial vessels waiting for escort is easily tracked on AIS. The Iranians do not need to intercept radio communications to know when a convoy is forming. They can see it on their own radar.
What the IRGC is doing
The IRGC's response to the convoy system has been calibrated. They have not attempted to block a convoy outright, which would be an act of war against the United States and its coalition partners. Instead, they have harassed, probed, and tested the escorts' response times and rules of engagement. Each attack has been slightly different: a missile from shore, a small-boat swarm, a loitering munition. The variety is deliberate. The IRGC is collecting intelligence on how the coalition defends against each threat type.
Between convoys, the IRGC continues to intercept and divert commercial vessels that are not under escort. Since Operation Project Freedom began, at least nine commercial ships attempting independent transits have been intercepted by IRGC fast-attack craft. Three were boarded and diverted to Iranian ports. The other six were turned back. The message is clear: if you want to transit without the American convoy, you deal with the IRGC directly. If you want coalition protection, you wait your turn and accept the delays.
The IRGC has also stepped up its drone surveillance of the convoy formation itself. US Navy pilots have reported Shahed-series drones overflying convoys at altitudes of 5,000 to 8,000 feet, apparently collecting imagery and electronic intelligence. The coalition has chosen not to shoot down these surveillance drones unless they pose an imminent threat, a decision that some officers I spoke with find frustrating. "We are letting them film our formation, our response patterns, our sensor coverage," one surface warfare officer told me, on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss tactics. "Every convoy we run gives them more data on how we operate."
The ship that did not make the convoy
On May 19, the MT Helios Grace, a 2005-built product tanker flagged in Liberia and managed out of Piraeus, attempted an unescorted transit through the strait. The ship was carrying 60,000 metric tons of jet fuel from Jubail, Saudi Arabia, to Yokohama, Japan. Its owners had decided not to wait for a convoy slot, which was estimated at six days, because the cargo was time-sensitive and the charter party included a delay penalty of $45,000 per day.
The Helios Grace entered the strait at approximately 0300 local time, hoping to transit under cover of darkness. At 0347, its AIS signal showed a sudden course change to the north. The ship then went dark. It reappeared on AIS at 0820, now heading toward the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. The ship had been intercepted by two IRGC fast-attack craft and ordered to divert. As of May 27, it remains at anchor in Bandar Abbas. The 22 crew members, all Indian nationals, are reported safe but confined to the vessel. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs has filed a diplomatic protest. The IRGC has not publicly explained the seizure.
The Helios Grace is a reminder that the convoy system works only for ships that use it. The coalition cannot protect every vessel in the Gulf. It can only protect the ones that show up at the assembly point on time and follow the formation rules. Ships that go it alone are on their own.
The strain on the Navy
Maintaining continuous convoy operations is demanding. The US Navy has committed the Eisenhower carrier strike group, which includes the carrier itself, the guided-missile cruiser USS Philippine Sea, and three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers including the Carney. The UK has deployed the Defender and the frigate HMS Lancaster. France has committed the Bretagne and the frigate FS Auvergne. Saudi Arabia's two frigates, the Al Riyadh and the Dammam, operate in the southern approaches but do not enter the strait itself.
That is a significant commitment of surface combatants for a sustained operation with no end date. The Eisenhower group was originally scheduled to rotate out of the 5th Fleet area of responsibility in June. That rotation has been postponed indefinitely. Crew fatigue is a real concern. Sailors on the escort vessels are working 16-hour days in temperatures that routinely exceed 40 degrees Celsius on deck. The psychological strain of operating in a contested environment where attacks have already occurred is cumulative. A Navy spouse I spoke with, whose husband serves on the Carney, told me that the crew's morale message board has become noticeably quieter since the May 5 missile engagement. "They are doing their jobs," she said. "But they are tired."
The convoy system is holding. Eighteen convoys have completed their transits. Sixty-seven commercial vessels have been escorted safely through. No escorted vessel has been hit. But the attacks on the escorts are escalating in sophistication, and the operation is consuming resources that the Navy cannot sustain forever. At some point, the political calculus has to shift from military escort to diplomatic resolution. The convoy is a bandage, not a cure.